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REVERSAL OF CONVICTION ON LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE DOES NOT PERMIT RETRIAL OF
FIRST DEGREE MURDER CHARGE.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)
The defendant was charged under an indictment of arson and first
degree murder' in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia.
He was convicted of arson and second degree murder. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the conviction for second
degree murder and remanded. At the second trial the defendant was con-
victed of first degree murder.
The Supreme Court of the United States heard the appeal from the
first degree murder charge and by a five to four decision reversed on the
ground that the retrial on the first degree charge was a violation of the
double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution.2
The majority refused to extend Trono v. United States3 beyond its
factual setting. The Trono case held that by an appeal of a conviction of
a lesser included offense the defendant waived any implied acquittal of
the more serious offense. That case arose from a statute governing the
Philippine Islands, but the majority made it clear that they considered it of
like effect with the fifth amendment. The Court had ruled the same way
on this precise point the year before.4
Considering the Trono case still good law the dissent in the principal
case contends the defendant should be held to have appealed at his own
risk of conviction on the more serious charge. Apparently this contention
is bottomed on the premise that a retrial on the whole indictment is a neces-
sary conclusion from the decisions culminating in United States v. Ball,'
which declare that a retrial may be ordered when the defendant obtains a
reversal of a conviction.'
Two dominant themes permeate federal double jeopardy: (1) only
1 35 STAT. 1143, 1152 (1909), 18 U.S.C. §1111 (1952), in part provides,
murder "committed in perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate any arson
... is murder in the first degree."
2 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
3 199 U.S. 521 (1905). Four justices dissented. Mr. Justice Holmes concurred
in result only. See Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in Kepner v. United States, 195
U.S. 100, 134 (1904).
4 Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
5163 U. S. 662 (1896). See also, Hopi v. Utah 104 U.S. 631 (1881).
G The Ball court rejected the theory that defendant could not be retried after
a reversal because ". . . such a wooden interpretation would distort the purposes
of the constitutional provision to the prejudice of society's legitimate interest in
convicting the guilty. . . ." Supra note 2, at 204 (dissent).
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the defendant may appeal, the right being his,' and (2) if the defendant
exercises this right, the appellate courts have the power to remand for a
new trial on the same indictment.'
The United States' statutes list first and second degree murder as
separate offenses.9 But are they functionally separable when they are sub-
mitted to a jury under an indictment charging first degree murder only?
Can there be a retrial of only the less serious crime?
It is not unlikely that a jury may think of these two crimes as vary-
ing only in the degree of punishment accorded, and find the lesser degree
out of compassion and not because of any -basis in fact. This may have
been what happened at the first trial of Green. The court's charge as to
second degree murder was erroneous since there was no evidence in the
record to support it. There was ample evidence to sustain a first degree
murder conviction. Yet, the jury convicted Green of second degree
murder.1 0
The considerations of the government's right to retrial, mentioned
above, have -been discarded. The court considered of first importance the
defendant's right to capitalize on an error in the trial. Having thus capi-
talized it is now held that he cannot be retried for the higher offense.
The constitution does not forbid a new trial if the case were reversed at
the defendant's urging since the right to appeal is coupled with the
possibility of a new trial. 1 Yet the effect of the majority ruling here is
to ,cut off the government's right to a new trial except on terms not
hitherto suspected.
The defendant has a choice of accepting the trial outcome or upset-
ting it at the risk of a new trial.'" This is the basic philosophy of double
jeopardy. The question here is shall this new trial -be on the whole original
indictment or limited only to the offense of which convicted and any lesser
included offenses? The state decisions go both ways, nineteen of the thirty-
six states which have considered the problem permitting retrial of the more
7 Kepner v. United States, supra note 4.
8 United States v. Ball, supra note 5.
9 Murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought." Murder committed in perpetration of arson is first degree murder.
Second degree murder is any killing with malice aforethought not constituting
first degree murder. 35 STAT. 1143, 1152 (1909), 18 U.S.C. §1111(a) (1952).
10 Green was indicted for arson and felony-murder at the first trial. There
was no evidential basis for any murder conviction except that of first degree. That
there was sufficient evidence for a first degree conviction is attested by the jury's
conviction on that count at the second trial.
11 United States v. Ball, supra note 5, Hopt. v. United States, supra note 5.
For lower federal court decisions see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in prin-
cipal case.
12The English rule is different. Rex v. Mawbey, 101 Eng. Rep. 736 (1796).
The English appellate courts may not generally order a retrial even after a reversal
of conviction. Criminal Appeals Act, 1908, 7 EDw. 7 c. 23, §4(2).
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serious offense.13 But the practical considerations of a trial on varying
degrees of murder plus the precedent of the Trono case make the result
of this case startling.
Richard V. Patchen
13 For an exhaustive collection of the cases see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in the principal case, supra note 2, 216-18.
